The Moral Irrelevance ofAutonomy

30 Where did the idea get started that autonomy is a moral
idea which all rational persons ought to pursue and a
constitutive feature of normal adult human life? Perhaps
it was on an island, where controlling the boats that arrived
on and departed from one's shores was essential for
survival. If exercising control over one's watery
boundaries means the difference between life and death,
then control will become an important feature of that form
of life. It is also likely that certain habits will be
encouraged, habits like disciplining one's thoughts and
emotions, pursuing one's interests, deliberately formulating
a plan of life, and sticking to it. But "control" may come
at the cost of other habits, such as "release," including the
capacity to express emotion, sacrifice one's own desires,
put the physical and spiritual needs of the vulnerable above
one's own. Informal observation of the world tells me that
the first set of traits is typically found in certain individuals
(e.g., male anglophile academics), and not in others (e.g.,
female conservative Christians), and more commonly
found in certain communities (e.g., secular institutions of
higher learning in western Europe and North America),
and not in others (e.g., loosely-knit networks of Iranian
women friends). This is not surprising, of course. The
first set of virtues are those conducive to the sustenance of
certain forms of life, and the second set are those conducive
to the sustenance of other forms of life. We should not
fault one for not being the other.

Response:
Comstock on Autonomy
Leslie P. Francis
University of Utah
There are many things to say about Comstock's
paper. I want to comment on two issues: the role of
"line drawing about autonomy" in the discussion of our
treatment of animals and the conclusion that fuller
a'ltonomy might decrease the moral quality of the life
of a caring woman such as Carrie.
Comstock's basic point is that "autonomy is virtually
useless as a line telling us which beings have and which
beings do not have moral standing." The bulk of his
paper is devoted to an argument that autonomy is not
always part of a good life for human beings. aimed to
show that a line drawn in terms of autonomy between
humans and nonhumans is at best very fuzzy, But what
is the relevance of this strategy to conclusions we might
draw about our treatment of animals?
Comstock's strategy is directed to an argument for
differential treatment of humans and nonhumans which
goes like this. Defenders of the differential treatment
of humans and nonhumans rely on showing that humans
and nonhumans have different moral statuses. One
method of showing this different status is to attribute a
property to humans that nonhumans lack. Autonomy
is the property used by Frey to draw this line. But if
the line cannot be drawn, because autonomy is not of
value to all humans, then we cannot show that humans
and nonhumans have different moral statuses and thus
that it is permissible to treat them differently.
But there are crucial gaps in Comstock's strategy.
First, even if we grant that increased autonomy would
not be good for all humans, it does not follow that
autonomy is irrelevant to how we ought to treat them.
Second, there are many ways to defend differential

31 It is also to employ the sort of gendered language
feminists have taught us to recognize as rhetorical in the worst
sense. It is the worst because it sounds benign even as it
carries powerful political import. Its use has long been the
most subtle and effective tool with which one group (often
composed primarily but not exclusively of men) has, wittingly
or unwittingly, marginalized the moral experiences and
languages of other groups (often composed largely but not
exclusively of women). To continue to pursue such ways of
speaking is not profitable for those of us trying to listen "with
a different ear" to "the different voices" not only of women
but also of all those historically excluded from the moral
philosophers' games. I take the phrases from Gilligan and
Claudia Card, the latter of whom has written that "It is
important to listen to women with a dijferenJ ear, not simply
to listen for a dijferenJ voice in women." Card, "Women's
Voices," p. 134.

32In addition to the commentators whose responses follow,
I have profited from the criticisms of Ned Hettinger, Peter
List, Phil Quinn, Richard Noland, and Harry Frankfurt. I
discussed the paper with colleagues in the Philosophy
Departments at Oregon State University and Western Illinois
University; read it at the Society for the Study of Ethics and
Animals at the 1990 Pacific Division Meeting; and read it
again at a conference on animal rights at San Francisco State
University in April, 1990.

Winter 1992

DISCUSSION

27

Between the Species

Francis: Response to Comstock

I hire (and properly credit) a research assistant? If I join
with others to develop a team-taught course in which we
reciprocally rely on each other's contributions? Comstock
describes an open-ended linkage between autonomy and
self-reliance, under which it is unclear whether such
appropriate forms of interdependence and cooperation
might violate autonomy.
Internal self-control is the second element of
autonomy as described by Comstock. He refers to this
element as "making higher order decisions about the
relative imporlance of lower order desires," "devot[ing
ourselves] to the desires [we] desire most," and as
"forego[ing] certain lower order preferences." There
is a clear confusion here between structure and
substance. The regulative principle that we should order
our desires to allow coherent action toward what we
most want is not the same as the substantive requirement
that we should forego lesser pleasures such as recreation
in the service of higher values of achievement such as
academic promotion. Comstock's choice of career
achievement as a clear example of a higher order
preference once again suggests an apparent identification of autonomy with individualistic values.
Comstock's final element of autonomy is selfdetermination in the sense of choosing for ourselves
who we want to be. Sometimes Comstock suggests
this means being free altogether of background
influences, such as family traditions. At other points
he suggests it means only deliberately selecting our own
life from a menu of conceptions of the good life.
Comstock's example offailed self-determination is the
man who stays with the family business rather than
becoming a painter, a choice described as letting others
impose their conceptions of the good life on him. ·But
bowing to his father's dictates is only one explanation
of such a choice, the explanation that would involve a
clear loss of self-determination. Other explanations of
the choice, such as concern for his father or desire to carry
on the family tradition, stem from nonindividualistic
values that may not indicate a loss of self-determination.
Now why is Carrie deficient in autonomy? She
muddles through life, in a motherly way, thinking she
might like to do something else. Here are some
deficiencies listed by Comstock:

treatment of humans and nonhumans short of showing
they have different moral statuses. Suppose, for
example, that someone wants to defend a preference
for using nonhuman animals for risky, nontherapeutic
medical research, under circumstances in which
research subjects are necessary for the discovery of
scientific knowledge that is likely to reduce human
mortality or morbidity, utilization of research subjects
is limited, and pain and risks to subjects are minimized
consistent with scientific requirements. This preference
might be defended on utilitarian grounds. Or it might
be defended on the ground that there are different and
stronger objections to the killing of humans than there
are to the killing of nonhumans. Relations among
humans, rights, and even autonomy might be the basis
for such objections. Whatever we think of these
arguments, rejecting a bright line drawn in terms of
autonomy doesn't answer the human chauvinist who
has more limited reasons for his humanoid preferences.
On Comstock's account, autonomy requires selfdetermination on three fronts. (Comstock says his
account is based on Frey's, and I'll let Frey speak for
himself about whether it is his.) Autonomy requires,
first, acting on our own behalf, that is, self-reliance;
. second, ordering our own preferences, that is, selfcontrol; and third, deciding on our own about the kind
of life we want to lead, i.e., self-determination. There
is ambiguity in Comstock's presentation of these
elements of autonomy, particularly with respect to how
individualistic and how radical they are.
Comstock describes the requirement of self-reliance
variously, as "the freedom to acton our own behalf,"" 'our
desire to achieve things for ourselves,' " "rely[ing] on
[our] own talents and powers," "not [being] subject to
control by paternalistic outside forces," and being" 'free
of the coercive influence of others.'" The example he
gives of this requirement is a woman who refuses to let
her husband write the papers necessary for her to get
tenure. Because of this example, and because Comstock's
third element focuses on external influences on choice, I
take this first requirement of autonomy to be about
standing on one's own feet, being independent and selfreliant. The woman who lets her husband establish her
credentials is an extreme case; She is fraudulently
claiming credit for someone else's work and not achieving
what she ought to achieve on her own. But Comstock's
descriptions suggest that he has a broader range of selfreliance in mind for autonomy. How much broader,
however, is difficult to determine. Do I lack autonomy if

Between the Species

I. She has not deliberately chosen a life plan.
2. The causal explanation for what she doesmothering-is largely her upbringing.
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knowledge and a more secure sense of her own value
might well be at odds with the person Carrie now is.
She does not think in these ways, and if she did, she
might reexamine her background and change some of
what she values. On the other hand, a fuller sense of
her own value and possibilities might resolve some of
Carrie's current dissatisfaction and place her current
virtues, her nurturance and caring, on a more secure
footing in her life. There are risks to autonomy, but
Comstock is wrong to see these risks as principally the
risks of selfishness.
Finally, suppose we grant that a more autonomous
Carrie would have lost something of value. It does not
follow that autonomy is irrelevant to how others should
treat her. Even if she does not recognize her own worth
and demand more, she is wronged by someone who
pays her too little. Carrie is in a classic double bind
situation diagnosed by feminists: hurt if she risks
changes, yet diminished even in her own eyes if she
does not. Respecting her autonomy in this context raises
complex and important issues. Participants in the debate
over how to treat both humans and nonhurnans, in may
different contexts, would do better to focus on the
characteristics of creatures and their situations that
matter morally, and why and how these characteristics
matter, rather than bright lines or irrelevance.

3. What she does involves the fulfillment of"lower
order" desires, motherhood and nurturance,
rather than a "career" (I put "career" in quotes
because the implication that motherhood is not
a "career" is Comstock's, not mine).
4. She allows herself to pursue cooperative
strategies and takes interest in others' needs
rather than her own self-interest.
5. She does not pursue what she thinks she would
like to do most, be a hospital volunteer or a nurse.
The last three of these focus largely on Carrie's failure
to pursue her own self-interest. That she seeks
motherhood rather than a "career," puts others' interests
before her own preferences, and continues her current
job rather than volunteering in a hospital, go to the content
of what she has chosen rather than to the structure of her
choosing. The first two deficiencies-her failure to
choose a life plan and the fact that her upbringing largely
explains her life--come closer to the core notion of
autonomy as freedom of choice. But even here, what
Comstock says links autonomy to a rejection of
background and tradition that is far too strong.
To see this, consider some other possible deficiencies
in Carrie as a chooser, that Comstock does not mention:
6. Carrie lacks important knowledge about the
courses of life available to her. She apparently
has little experience of what nursing is actually
like and whether she would enjoy it. She
believes, falsely, that her family would oppose
a change, so she perceives herself as hemmed
in, when she is not.
c~
~.

7. She is paid the wages of a secretary rather than
an administrative assistant, and she accepts this
exploitation uncomplainingly, without apparently
even recognizing it.
8. She is vaguely dissatisfied with her life, casting
out for something different but not knowing
how to go about finding it.
These do suggest defects in Carrie as a chooser: lack
of knowledge, a failure to value her own contributions,
and the vague sense that whatever it is that she wants,
she is not getting it. To be sure, the search for fuller
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